| Rank | Model | Score |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | glm-5-3 | 54.4 |
| 2 | kimi-k3 | 32.2 |
| 3 | qwen3-8-max | 28.8 |
| 4 | glm-5-2 | 24.4 |
1 phaseActive
Capability-ladder cybersecurity benchmark — scores AI agents on 16 graded exploitation flags against 41 hardened, real-world V8 bugs.
Quick answer: ExploitBench treats exploitation as a ladder, not a binary crash/no-crash outcome. It decomposes exploiting a real vulnerability into 16 measurable capability flags — from reaching vulnerable code, through triggering a crash, building sandbox primitives and arbitrary read/write, up to full arbitrary code execution — verified by deterministic oracles across 41 real, hardened V8 JavaScript engine bugs.
What it tests: How far an AI agent can climb a graded exploitation capability ladder against real, production-hardened vulnerabilities in V8 (the JS/WASM engine behind Chrome, Edge, and Node.js) — not just whether it can crash the target.
Why it matters: Prior benchmarks collapse exploitation into a single binary success/failure signal, hiding exactly where models struggle. ExploitBench's 16-flag ladder shows that reaching and crashing vulnerable code is comparatively routine for frontier models, while arbitrary code execution against hardened targets remains an emerging, largely unsolved capability.
Known limitations: Narrow domain — 41 tasks, all V8-specific. The authors note a sharp split between publicly deployed frontier models (where full code execution is rare) and an unnamed private/internal model (which reaches it roughly half the time), suggesting public model results understate the frontier's true capability ceiling.
Each of ExploitBench's 41 instances is a real V8 bug, chosen specifically because V8 is both widely deployed and heavily exploitation-hardened. Rather than scoring a single "did it work" outcome, the benchmark decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags spanning five tiers: coverage, bug triggering, V8-internal primitives, general memory-corruption primitives, and arbitrary code execution. Each flag is verified by a deterministic oracle — using per-run randomized challenge-response checks for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution — so results can't be gamed by a lucky crash.
The paper reports results across three evaluation arms: <model, environment> as the primary measure of model-environment capability, <model, environment, adaptive coaching> to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model, environment, harness> as an ablation swapping in a vendor's native CLI harness to check for vendor-side optimization effects. Across the 8 publicly deployed frontier models tested, reaching vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution against these hardened targets is not — establishing exploit construction against hardened real-world software as an emerging frontier capability rather than a solved problem.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Task category | Cybersecurity / Agent |
| Metric | Average % coverage score (share of the 16-flag capability ladder achieved) across 3 revisions per task |
| Number of tasks | 41 (all real V8 bugs) |
| Primary evaluation arm | <model, environment> |
| Saturation | Low |
| Created by | Seunghyun Lee, David Brumley |
| Paper | arXiv:2605.14153 |
The scores below all follow the paper's own official evaluation settings (per Zhipu AI's GLM-5.3 launch blog, which states its evaluation "follows the official evaluation settings": max 300 interaction rounds, average coverage score over all 41 tasks across 3 revisions), so they're directly comparable.
| Model | Score | Source | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| GLM-5.3 | 54.4% | Zhipu AI GLM-5.3 launch blog | 2026-08 |
| Kimi K3 | 32.2% | Zhipu AI GLM-5.3 launch blog | 2026-08 |
| Qwen3.8 Max | 28.8% | Zhipu AI GLM-5.3 launch blog | 2026-08 |
| GLM-5.2 | 24.4% | Zhipu AI GLM-5.3 launch blog | 2026-08 |